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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of information-theoretic Secret Key Establishment (SKE) in the
presence of a passive adversary, Eve, when Alice and Bob are connected by a pair of independent discrete
memoryless broadcast channels in opposite directions. We refer to this setup as 2DMBC. We define the
secret-key capacity in the 2DMBC setup and prove lower and upper bounds on this capacity. The lower
bound is achieved by a two-round SKE protocol that uses a two-level coding construction. We show that
the lower and the upper bounds coincide in the case of degraded DMBCs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret Key Establishment (SKE) is a fundamental problem in cryptography: Alice and Bob want to
share a secret key in the presence of an adversary, Eve. We consider information theoretic SKE where
there is no assumption on Eve’s computational power and assume Eve is passive and can only eavesdrop
the communication between Alice and Bob. It has been proven that SKE is impossible if Alice and Bob are
connected by an insecure and reliable channel with no prior correlated information [15]. Thus, information-
theoretic solutions to the SKE problem assume that resources such as channels and/or correlated sources
are available to the parties. We refer to a specific collection of resources available to the parties as a setup.
One method of establishing a secure key between Alice and Bob is Alice choosing a random key and
sending it as a message securely to Bob. This is essentially using a secure message transmission protocol
for SKE. In a pioneering work, Wyner [23] considered the scenario of secure communication over noisy
channels, where there is a Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC), called the main channel from Alice to
Bob, and a second DMC, called the wiretap channel, from Bob to Eve, through which Eve can observe
a (degraded) noisy version of what Bob receives from Alice. See Fig. 1(a). Wyner defined the secrecy
capacity, Cs, in this setup as the highest rate of secure and reliable message transmission from Alice
to Bob. He proved a single-letter characterization for the secrecy capacity that implies the possibility
of secure message transmission if the main channel has a non-zero (communication) capacity and the
wiretap channel is noisy. Wyner’s work on secure message transmission is important because, contrary to
the well-known Shannon’s model of secure communication [20], (i) it does not assume any prior shared
secret key and, (ii) rather than spending resources to realize noiseless channels, it uses channel noise to
provide security. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [6] generalized Wyner’s wiretap channel setup by introducing noisy
broadcast channel with two receivers, where there is a Discrete Memoryless Broadcast Channel (DMBC)
with one sender (Alice) and two receivers (Bob and Eve). See Fig. 1(b). They determined the secrecy
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2capacity of this setup and showed that secure message transmission from Alice to Bob is possible if Bob’s
channel is less noisy [12], compared to Eve’s. The results of this study have been extended to the case
of Gaussian channels [14].
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Fig. 1. The comparison of (a) Wyner’s wire-tap channel and (b) Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s broadcast channel
The work in [23] and [6] can be used for SKE, inasmuch as achievable rates for secure message
transmission and secret key establishment become the same in these setups. Later work has followed two
directions: one aiming at applying the SKE results to real-life communication scenarios such as SKE
in wireless environments [3], and the second considering SKE in new setups. Public discussion channel
[1], [7], [15], secure feedback channel [2], modulo-additive feedback channel [13], [22], and correlated
sources [10], [19] are examples of new ingredients to build such setups.
Maurer [15] and concurrently Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1] studied SKE when there exists a DMBC
from Alice to Bob (and Eve) and a public discussion channel between Alice and Bob that is unlimitedly
available to send messages in both directions. This latter channel is reliable but insecure, i.e., Eve can
fully eavesdrop the communication. It was shown that SKE in this setup may be possible even in cases
where the secrecy capacity of the DMBC is zero. The work in [1], [15] also includes the setup where the
DMBC is replaced with a Discrete Memoryless Multiple Source (DMMS) between the parties. Csisza´r
and Narayan [7] studied SKE in a slightly different setup that consists of a DMMS and a limited-rate
one-way public channel from Alice to Bob. Ahlswede and Cai [2] showed that the secrecy capacity in
Wyner’s setup can be increased by adding an unlimited secure (and reliable) output feedback channel. This
channel is only used to feed back the information received at the output of the forward channel. Noisy
feedback over modulo-additive broadcast channels [13], [22] is another extension of the SKE problem.
SKE using a DMBC from Alice to Bob and (Eve) and a DMMS between the three parties was considered
in [10] and independently in [19].
Assuming the existence of (free) public discussion, secure feedback, or modulo-additive feedback
channels lets us build setups that allow interactive communication between Alice and Bob. In these
setups, Alice and Bob can benefit from multi-round SKE protocols to achieve higher secret-key rates.
In practice, however, such channels may not exist and it may not be necessarily the best strategy (for
maximizing the secret-key rate) to realize them from given resources.
A. Our work
We consider a new setup for SKE where Alice and Bob are connected by a pair of independent DMBCs
in opposite directions. We refer to this setup as 2DMBC. This setup is a realistic scenario that models
wireless networks where two nodes communicate over wireless channels in two directions, and their
3communication is eavesdropped by neighbors in their communication range. The 2DMBC setup gives the
promise of interactive communication, while the only resources provided to the parties are DMBCs.
We define SKE in the 2DMBC setup as a multi-round protocol between Alice and Bob with the aim
of establishing a secure and reliable key. In analogy to the secrecy capacity [6], [15], [23], we define the
secret-key capacity in this setup, denoted by C2DMBCsk , as the maximum achievable secret-key rate, in
bits per use of the channel. We have the following results.
1) Lower bound: We give a lower bound on the secret-key capacity. We propose a two-round SKE
protocol that uses a two-level channel coding construction, and prove that it achieves the lower bound.
Our lower bound can also be derived by using the SKE protocols in the DMMS-and-DMBC setup [10],
[19]. However, while the SKE protocols proposed in [10], [19] are combinations of different constructions
for different cases (depending on the setup’s specification), our proposed SKE protocol uses a concrete
construction that achieves the lower bound for all cases.
2) Upper bound: We prove an upper bound on the secret-key capacity. This bound holds for all the
secret-key rates achievable by SKE protocols with no limitation on the number of communication rounds.
3) Degraded 2DMBCs: We study the 2DMBC setup when the broadcast channels are degraded. We
show that in this setup the lower and the upper bounds coincide, and the secret-key capacity can be
achieved by a one round SKE protocol. This implies that, in the case of degraded 2DMBCs, interactive
communication cannot improve the secret-key rate and the optimal solution is key transport, i.e., one party
choosing a key and sending it securely though the (one-way) DMBC, i.e., following the the work in [6].
B. Discussion
1) Types of key establishment protocols: We observe that SKE in the 2DMBC setup can take one of
the following forms:
(A) Key Transport, where one party selects the key prior to the start of the protocol and the protocol is
mainly used to deliver the key to the recipient in a secure and reliable manner.
(B) Key Agreement, where the final secret key is not selected by a single party prior to the start of
the protocol. Instead, it is a (possibly randomized) function of the inputs of the two parties. The
randomness in the function comes from the channel noise.
We note that method (A) is essentially secure message transmission, while method (B) is purely for sharing
a secret key. It may be argued that key agreement protocols (type (B)) offer a higher level of security as
the key is not determined by a single party.
2) Secrecy capacity vs. secret-key capacity: The secrecy capacity was originally defined in [6], [23]
for secure message transmission over one-way noisy channels. The definition secret-key capacity was first
defined in [1]. Following these two definitions, one can define secrecy capacity and secret-key capacity
for a given setup. As discussed in Section I-B1, a protocol for secure message transmission in a setup
can always be used for SKE in that setup, and so, in any setup, the secret-key capacity is at least equal
to the secrecy capacity.
In [6], [23], there is only a one-way channel from Alice to Bob (and Eve) and the only way to establish
a key is to use choose one and send it using a secure message transmission protocol. Hence the secret-key
capacity is equal to the secrecy capacity. The same result holds for setups that include a (free) public
4discussion channel [1], [7], [15] since any SKE protocol can be used along with a one-time pad encryption
for the purpose of secure message transmission. In the 2DMBC setup, however, the two capacities are
not necessarily the same. This is because the only accessible channels are noisy channels and to send the
encrypted message (using the established key) a reliable communication channel needs to be constructed
first. The relationship between the two capacities is not in the scope of this paper.
3) Strong and weak secrecy/secret-key capacity: The notion of secret-key capacity defined in this
paper follows the definition of secrecy capacity in [23] and later in [1], [6], [10], [15], [19]. The secrecy
requirement in these definitions is “weak” because it requires Eve’s uncertainty rate to be negligible. A
“stronger” variation is requiring Eve’s total uncertainty to be negligible. Maurer and Wolf [16] showed
that replacing the (weak) secrecy requirement by the stronger one does not decrease the secrecy capacity
of setups considered in [6], [15], [23]. A similar proof can be used to show that the secrecy-key capacity
in the 2DMBC setup remains the same, regardless of which secrecy requirement is used. This means that
our results are also valid for the strong secret-key capacity.
C. Notation
We use calligraphic letters (U ) to denote finite alphabets. We denote random variables (RVs) and their
realizations over these sets by the corresponding letters in uppercase (U ) and lowercase (u). The size
of the set U is denoted by |U|. Un is the set of all sequences of length n (so called n-sequences) with
elements from U . Un = (U1, U2, . . . , Un) ∈ Un denotes a random n-sequence in Un.
Let X be an RV over the set X , denoted by X ∈ X . We denote its probability distribution by PX and
its entropy by H(X). Given a pair of RVs, (X,Y ) ∈ X × Y , we denote the joint distribution of X and
Y by PX,Y and their joint entropy by H(X,Y ). The conditional probability distribution and the entropy
of Y given X are denoted by PY |X and H(Y |X), respectively. The mutual information between X and
Y is denoted by I(X;Y ). Given RVs (X,Y,Z) ∈ X ×Y ×Z , we denote by PY,Z|X the conditional joint
distribution of Y and Z when X is known, and by I(X;Y |Z) the mutual information between X and Y
when Z is known. X ↔ Y ↔ Z denotes a Markov chain between the RVs X, Y , and Z in this order.
We use ‘||’ to show the concatenation of two sequences. For a value x, we use [x]+ to show max{0, x}.
D. Paper organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the setup and definitions. In Section III, we
prove a lower bound on the secret-key capacity in this setup. We prove an upper bound on this capacity
in Section IV. The degraded 2DMBC setup is studied in Section V. Section VI gives the concluding
remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
A Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC), denoted by X → Y , is a channel with input and output
alphabet sets X and Y , respectively, where each input symbol X ∈ X to the channel results in a single
output symbol Y ∈ Y , that is independent of previously communicated symbols. The channel is specified
by the conditional distribution PY |X .
A Discrete Memoryless Broadcast Channel (DMBC), denoted by X → (Y,Z), consists of two (not
necessarily independent) DMC’s, i.e., X → Y and X → Z . The channel is specified by the conditional
5distribution PY,Z|X . The secrecy capacity of the DMBC, X → (Y,Z), is defined as the maximum rate at
which Alice can reliably send information to Bob such that the rate at which Eve receives this information
is arbitrarily small [6], [23].
Definition 1: [6], [23] The secrecy capacity of the DMBC, specified by PY,Z|X , is denoted by Cs(PY,Z|X),
and is defined as the maximum real number Rs ≥ 0, such that for every δ > 0 and for sufficiently
large N , there exists a (possibly probabilistic) (2k, N) encoder, e : {0, 1}k → XN with a decoder,
d : YN → {0, 1}k , such that for a uniformly distributed binary k-sequence W k, we have XN = e(W k),
W ′k = d(Y N ) and the following conditions are satisfied:

k
N
> Rs − δ
1
k
H(W k|ZN ) > 1− δ
Pr(W ′k 6= W k) < δ
.
It has been proved that [6]
Cs(PY,Z|X) = max
PW,X
[I(W ;Y )− I(W ;Z)] ≥ max
PX
[I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)], (1)
where W is a random variable from an arbitrary set W such that W ↔ X ↔ (Y,Z) forms a Markov
chain.
We define a 2DMBC as a pair of independent DMBCs, i.e., a forward DMBC from Alice to Bob,
Xf → (Yf , Zf ), specified by PYf ,Zf |Xf over the finite sets Xf ,Yf ,Zf , and a backward DMBC from Bob
to Alice, Xb → (Yb, Zb), specified by PYb,Zb|Xb over Xb,Yb,Zb. See Fig. 2.
Forward DMBCXf
Yf
XZYP |
Eve
BobAlice
X
ZfZb
fff
Backward DMBC
bYb
bbb XZY
P |
Fig. 2. The 2DMBC setup
We consider the scenario where the 2DMBC is used to establish a shared secret key between Alice
and Bob. Alice and Bob use a (possibly) multi-round SKE protocol to exchange sequences of RVs in
consecutive rounds. In each communication round, either Alice or Bob sends a sequence of random
variables (RVs) as the DMBC input. The legitimate receiver (in this round) computes a sequence of RVs
to be sent in the next communication round. This sequence may depend on all previously communicated
(sent and/or received) sequences of RVs. At the end of the last communication round, each party (including
Eve) will have a set of communicated sequences, which form their “view” of the protocol. Let the RVs
V iewA, V iewB , and V iewE be the views of Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. Using their views, either
Alice or Bob computes a secret key S, while the other one computes an estimation of the key Sˆ. In a
secure SKE protocol, the established key is required to be random, reliable and secret. These security
requirements are formally defined below.
Definition 2: For Rsk ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the SKE protocol Π in the 2DMBC setup is (Rsk, δ)-secure
6if it results in the key S and its estimation Sˆ such that
H(S)
nf + nb
> Rsk − δ, (2a)
Pr(Sˆ 6= S) < δ, (2b)
H(S|V iewE)
H(S)
> 1− δ, (2c)
where nf and nb are the number of times that the forward and the backward channels are used, respectively.
When δ tends to zero, Rsk indicates the secret-key rate achievable by protocol Π, i.e., the ratio of the
key entropy to the total number of channel uses. We define the secret-key capacity as follows.
Definition 3: The secret-key capacity of a 2DMBC, with forward and backward channels specified by
PYf ,Zf |Xf , PYb,Zb|Xb , is denoted by C2DMBCsk (PYf ,Zf |Xf , PYb,Zb|Xb) and is defined as the largest Rsk ≥ 0
such that, for any arbitrarily small δ > 0, there exists an (Rsk, δ)-secure SKE protocol.
III. THE SECRET-KEY CAPACITY: LOWER BOUND
Let the RVs Xf , Yf , Zf (resp. Xb, Yb, Zb) be consistent with the distribution PYf ,Zf |Xf (resp. PYb,Zb|Xb),
specified by the channel. Let Vf , Vb, W1,f ,W2,f , W1,b,W2,b be random variables from arbitrary sets where,
Vf , Vb, (W1,f ,W2,f ), and (W1,b,W2,b) are independent and the following Markov chains are satisfied:
Vf ↔ Yf ↔ (Xf , Zf ) (3a)
W2,b ↔W1,b ↔ Xb ↔ (Yb, Zb), (3b)
Vb ↔ Yb ↔ (Xb, Zb) (3c)
W2,f ↔W1,f ↔ Xf ↔ (Yf , Zf ). (3d)
Theorem 1: Taking the above variables and letting
RAs1 = I(Vf ;Xf )− I(Vf ;Zf ), (4a)
RAs2 = I(W1,b;Yb|W2,b)− I(W1,b;Zb|W2,b), (4b)
RBs1 = I(Vb;Xb)− I(Vb;Zf ), (4c)
RBs2 = I(W1,f ;Yf |W2,f )− I(W1,f ;Zf |W2,f ), (4d)
the secret-key capacity is lower bounded as
C2DMBCsk ≥ max{LA, LB}, (5)
where
LA = max
nf ,nb,PXf ,Vf ,PXb,W2,b,W1,b
[
nfR
A
s1 + nb[R
A
s2]+
nf + nb
s. t. nfI(Vf ;Yf |Xf ) < nbI(W1,b;Yb)}
]
, (6)
LB = max
nf ,nb,PXb,Vb ,PXf ,W2,f ,W1,f
[
nbR
B
s1 + nf [R
B
s2]+
nf + nb
s. t. nbI(Vb;Yb|Xb) < nfI(W1,f ;Yf )}
]
. (7)
Proof : Appendix A.
7The proof of Theorem 1 uses a concrete two-round SKE protocol with a two-level coding construction.
We give an outline of the protocol for a special case where Alice is the initiator, and we have Vf = Yf ,
W1,b = Xb, and W2,b = 1. Let ηf , ηt, ηb, RAs , and κ be defined as
ηf = nfH(Yf ),
ηt = nfH(Yf |Xf ),
ηb = nbI(Xb;Yb)− ηt,
RAs =
nfR
A
s1 + nb[R
A
s2]+
nf + nb
,
κ = (nf + nb)R
A
s .
Alice chooses nf copies of Xf independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) w.r.t. PXf to create the
nf -sequence X
nf
f , and sends it over the forward DMBC. Bob receives Y
nf
f and maps it to an integer
F ∈ F = {1, 2, . . . , 2ηf } using a deterministic bijective mapping. He encodes F to an integer T ∈ T =
{1, 2, ..., 2ηt}; this is the first level of encoding. Bob chooses a uniformly random integer B ∈ B =
{1, 2, . . . , 2ηb} and encodes (T,B) to an nb-sequence Xnbb ; this is the second level of encoding. The
constructions of these encoders for the general case are described in Appendix A. Bob sends Xnbb over
the backward channel and Alice receives Y nbb . She first decodes Y
nb
b to (Tˆ , Bˆ) and then uses Tˆ to find the
appropriate codebook for decoding Xnff and to Fˆ (and hence Yˆ nff ). The decoder uses the jointly-typical
decoding technique.
The secret key is obtained by calculating S = g(F,B), where g is a function defined as follows. Letting
{Gi}
2κ
i=1 be a partition of F ×B into 2κ equal-sized parts, the function g : F ×B → {1, 2, . . . , 2κ} is such
that, for every input F,B ∈ Gi, outputs i. In Appendix A, we show that there exist appropriate encoding
and decoding functions that can be used to achieve the lower bound.
IV. THE SECRET-KEY CAPACITY: UPPER BOUND
Let the RVs Xf , Yf , Zf and Xb, Yb, Zb correspond to the 2DMBC setup specified by PYf ,Zf |Xf and
PYb,Zb|Xb , respectively.
Theorem 2: The secret-key capacity in the 2DMBC setup is upper bounded as
C2DMBCsk ≤ max
PXf ,PXb
{I(Xf ;Yf |Zf ), I(Xb;Yb|Zb)} (8)
Proof : Appendix B.
The upper bound is proved for the highest key rate achievable by a general SKE protocol with an
arbitrary number of communication rounds.
V. DEGRADED 2DMBCS
We define degraded 2DMBCs and prove that the lower and the upper bounds on C2s coincide in the
case of degraded 2DMBCs. Moreover, this capacity is achieved by a one-round SKE protocol that uses
one of the DMBCs.
Definition 4: The DMBC X → (Y,Z) is called obversely degraded if X ↔ Y ↔ Z forms a Markov
chain. It is called reversely degraded if X ↔ Z ↔ Y forms a Markov chain.
8We say the DMBC X → (Y,Z) has two independent subchannels, XO → (YO, ZO) and XR →
(YR, ZR), if its input X and output (Y,Z) can be represented as X = [XO,XR], Y = [YO, YR] and
Z = [ZO, ZR], respectively, such that
(YO, ZO)↔ XO ↔ XR ↔ (YR, ZR)
forms a Markov chain.
Definition 5: The DMBC X → (Y,Z) is called degraded if it can be represented by two independent
subchannels, XO → (YO, ZO) and XR → (YR, ZR), such that the former channel is obversely degraded
and the latter channel is reversely degraded, implying that
ZO ↔ YO ↔ XO ↔ XR ↔ ZR ↔ YR
is a Markov chain.
Note that Definition 5 covers cases where the DMBC is either obversely or reversely degraded. In such
cases, in fact only one of the subchannels exists, and the other one can be defined over empty sets of
input and outputs.
Definition 6: A 2DMBC is called degraded if both of its one-way DMBCs are degraded.
Theorem 3: For the degraded 2DMBC, specified by Xf → (Yf , Zf ) and Xb → (Yb, Zb), where
Xf = [Xf,O,Xf,R], Yf = [Yf,O, Yf,R], Zf = [Zf,O, Zf,R],
Xb = [Xb,O,Xb,R], Yb = [Yb,O, Yb,R], Zb = [Zb,O, Zb,R],
we have
Cd−2DMBCsk = max
PXf,O,Xb,O
{I(Xf,O;Yf,O|Zf,O), I(Xb,O;Yb,O|Zb,O)}.
Proof : Appendix C.
VI. CONCLUSION
The work on key establishment over a pair of independent discrete broadcast channels (the 2DMBC
setup) is inspired by real-life communication between peers, e.g., in wireless environments where the
communication between two peers is intercepted by neighbors in the communication range. We defined
the secret-key capacity in this setup and provided lower and upper bounds on this capacity. The lower
bound is achieved by a two-round SKE protocol that uses a two-level coding construction. We showed that,
when the broadcast channels are degraded, the lower and the upper bounds coincide and the secret-key
capacity is achieved by a one-round SKE protocol using one of the DMBCs.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1, THE LOWER BOUND
In parts of the proof, we use the channel coding theorem (e.g., [4, Theorem 8.7.1]), with a decoding
method based on so called jointly-typical bipartite sequences. A bipartite sequence XN = (Un||T d) is
the concatenation of two subsequences, Un and T d, with two (possibly different) probability distributions,
PUn and PT d , respectively, where N = n + d. We extend the definitions of jointly typical sequences to
bipartite jointly typical sequences as follows.
Definition 7: A sequence xN = (un||td) is an (ǫ, n)-bipartite typical sequence with respect to the
probability distribution pair (PU (u), PT (t)), iff
| −
1
N
logP (xN )−
nH(U) + dH(T )
N
| < ǫ, (9)
where P (xN ) is calculated as
P (xN ) =
N∏
i=1
P (xi) =
n∏
i=1
PU (ui)×
d∏
i=1
PT (ti). (10)
Definition 8: A pair of sequences (xN , yN ) = ((un||td), (u′n||t′d)) is an (ǫ, n)-bipartite jointly typical
pair of sequences with respect to the probability distribution pair (PU,U ′(u, u′), PT,T ′(t, t′)), iff xN
and yN are (ǫ, n)-bipartite typical sequences with respect to the marginal probability distribution pairs
(PU (u), PT (t)) and (PU ′(u′), P ′T (t′)), respectively, and
| −
1
N
logP (xN , yN )−
nH(U,U ′) + dH(T, T ′)
N
| < ǫ, (11)
where P (xN , yN ) is calculated as
P (xN , yN ) =
N∏
i=1
P (xi, yi) =
n∏
i=1
PU,U ′(ui, u
′
i)×
d∏
i=1
PT,T ′(ti, t
′
i). (12)
Definition 9: The set A(N,n)ǫ is the set of all (ǫ, n)-bipartite jointly typical pairs of sequences (xN , yN ) =
((un||td), (u′n||t′d)) with respect to the probability distribution pair (PU,U ′(u, u′), PT,T ′(t, t′)).
Theorem 4: (Joint AEP for bipartite sequences) Let (XN , Y N ) = ((Un||T d), (U ′n||T ′d)) be a pair
of bipartite random sequences of length N , (each part) drawn i.i.d. according to the distribution pair
(PU,U ′(u, u
′), PT,T ′(t, t
′)). Then, for large enough n and d, we have
1) Pr((XN , Y N ) ∈ A(N,n)ǫ )→ 1
2) (1− ǫ)2nH(U,U ′)+dH(T,T ′)−Nǫ ≤ |A(N,n)ǫ | ≤ 2nH(U,U ′)+dH(T,T ′)+Nǫ
3) If X˜N and Y˜ N are independent with the same marginal distributions as P (xN , yN ), i.e., (X˜N , Y˜ N )
is generated according to the distribution P (xN )P (yN ), then
Pr((X˜N , Y˜ N ) ∈ A(N,n)ǫ ) ≤ 2
−nI(U ;U ′)−dI(T ;T ′)+3Nǫ. (13)
Pr((X˜N , Y˜ N ) ∈ A(N,n)ǫ ) ≥ (1− ǫ)2
−nI(U ;U ′)−dI(T ;T ′)−3Nǫ. (14)
Proof : Appendix D.
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To prove Theorem 1, in the following, we propose a two-round SKE protocol, based on a two-level
coding construction, that achieves (6) when Alice initiates the protocol. One can show in a similar way
that (7) is achievable when Bob is the initiator.
Let the RVs Vf ,Xf , Yf , Zf , and W1,b,W2,b,Xb, Yb, Zb be the same as defined in Section III (for
Theorem 1); hence, the Markov chains in (3) are satisfied. Also let nf and nb be integers that satisfy
the constraint condition in (6). For simplicity, we use W1,W2, and V to refer to W1,b,W2,b, and Vf ,
respectively. Accordingly, we write the argument to be maximized in (6) as
Rsk =
nfR
A
s1 + nb[R
A
s2]+
nf + nb
(15)
where
RAs1 = I(V ;Xf )− I(V ;Zf ), (16a)
RAs2 = I(W1;Yb|W2)− I(W1;Zb|W2), (16b)
and we rephrase the constraint condition in (6) as
nbI(W1;Yb) ≥ nf (I(V ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α), (17)
where α > 0 is an small constant to be determined (later) from δ. We shall show that for any given δ > 0,
for sufficiently large nf and nb that satisfy (17), we have
1
nf + nb
H(S) ≥ Rs − δ, (18a)
Pr(Sˆ 6= S) < δ, (18b)
H(S|Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
H(S)
> 1− δ. (18c)
We describe a two-level coding construction and prove that it can achieve the above secret-key rate. Let
N = nf + nb and ǫ, β > 0 be small constants determined from α such that 3Nǫ < nbβ = nfα. Let
nb = nb,1 + nb,2, where nb,2 is chosen to satisfy
nb,2I(W1;Yb) = nf (I(V ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α). (19)
We first define the following quantities, sets and function which are used in the sequel.
ηf = nf [I(V ;Yf ) + α], (20)
ηt = nb,2[I(W1;Yb)− β], ηt,2 = nb,2I(W2;Yb), ηt,1 = ηt − ηt,2, (21)
ηb = nb,1[I(W1;Yb)− β], ηb,2 = nb,1I(W2;Yb), ηb,1 = ηb − ηb,2, (22)
η1 = ηt,1 + ηb,1, η2 = ηt,2 + ηb,2, η = ηf + ηb, (23)
κ = (nf + nb)Rsk, γ = η − κ. (24)
Although the quantities obtained in (19)-(24) are real values, for sufficiently large nb and nf , we can
approximate them by integers. Since β can be made arbitrarily small, we can assume ηb and ηt are non-
negative. Furthermore, it is easy to see that, for arbitrarily small α, we can assume ηf ≥ ηt and γ is
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non-negative. We show them respectively as follows
ηf
(a)
= nf [I(V ;Yf ,Xf ) + α] = nfI(V ;Xf ) + nfI(V ;Yf |Xf ) + nfα
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nb,2I(W1, Yb)− 2nfα ≥ nb,2I(W1, Yb)− 2nfα ≥ ηt − 2nfα,
η = ηf + ηb = nfI(V ;Xf ) + nb,2I(W1, Yb)− 2nfα+ nb,1I(W1, Yb)
≥ nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1, Yb)− 2nfα ≥ R
A
s1 +R
A
s2 − 2nfα ≥ κ− 2nfα,
where equality (a) is due to the Markov chain Xf ↔ Yf ↔ V , and the rest of the steps follow from the
above relations (15)-(24). The following sets and functions are used to design the SKE protocol.
(i) Vnf is the set of all possible nf -sequences with elements from V . Create Vnfǫ by randomly and
independently selecting 2ηf ǫ-typical sequences (w.r.t. PV ) from Vnf .
(ii) Let f : Vnfǫ → F = {1, 2, . . . , 2ηf } be an arbitrary bijective mapping; denote its inverse by f−1.
(iii) Let {Vnfi,ǫ }2
ηt
i=1 be a partition of V
nf
ǫ into 2ηt equal-sized parts. Define the function t : Vnfǫ → T =
{1, 2, . . . , 2ηt} such that, for any input in Vnfi,ǫ , it outputs i.
(iv) Let {Ti}2ηt,2i=1 be a partition of T into 2ηt,2 equal-sized parts. Label elements of part i as Ti = {ti,j}ηt,1j=1.
Define tindx : T → {1, . . . , 2ηt,2} × {1, . . . , 2ηt,1} such that tindx(t) = (i, j), if t is labeled by ti,j .
(v) Let B = {1, 2, . . . , 2ηb}. In analogy to T , let {Bi}2ηb,2i=1 be a partition of B where Bi = {bi,j}2
ηb,1
j=1 .
Define bindx : B → {1, . . . , 2ηb,2} × {1, . . . , 2ηb,1} such that bindx(b) = (i, j), if b is labeled by bi,j .
(vi) Let {Gi}2κi=1 be a partition of F × B into parts of size 2γ . Define g : F × B → {1, 2, . . . , 2κ} such
that, for any input in Gi, it outputs i.
(vii) Define the codebook C2 as a the collection of 2η2 codewords {wnb2,t2,b2 : t2 = 1, 2, . . . , 2ηt,2 , b2 =
1, 2, . . . , 2ηb,2}, where each codeword wnb2,t2,b2 is of length nb and is independently generated accord-
ing to the distribution
nb∏
i=1
p(W2 = w2,t2,b2(i)).
(viii) For each wnb2,t2,b2 , define the codebook C1(wnb2,t2,b2) as the collection of 2η1 codewords {wnb1,t2,b2,t1,b1 : t1 =
1, . . . , 2ηt,1 b1 = 1, . . . , 2
ηb,1}, where each codeword,w1,t2,b2,t1,b1 , is of length nb and is independently
generated according to the distribution
nb∏
i=1
p(W1 = w1,t2,b2,t1,b1(i)|W2 = w2,t2,b2(i)).
(ix) Let Enc : T × B → Wnb1 be an encoding function such that Enc(t, b) = wnb1,t2,b2,t1,b1 , using the
above codebooks, where (t2, t1) = tindx(t) and (b2, b1) = bindx(b).
(x) Let DMCW be the DMC, W1 → Xb, that is specified by PXb|W1 .
Encoding. Alice selects an i.i.d. nf -sequence Xnff and sends it over the forward DMBC. Bob and Eve
receive Y nff and Z
nf
f , respectively. Bob finds a sequence V nf ∈ V
nf
ǫ that is ǫ-jointly typical with Y nff
(w.r.t. PV,Yf ); he returns a NULL if no such sequence is found. He computes T = t(V nf ) and then selects
an independent uniformly random B ∈ B. Bob calculates (T2, T1) = tindx(T ) and (B2, B1) = bindx(B),
and use them to calculate W nb1 = Enc(T,B) (see the encoder construction in (ix)). Next, he inputs W nb1
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to DMCW to compute Xnbb , and sends X
nb
b over the backward DMBC. Alice and Eve receive Y
nb
b and
Znbb , respectively.
Decoding. Alice first finds a unique codeword Wˆ nb1 ∈ C1 that is ǫ-jointly typical to Y nbb (w.r.t. PW1,Yb);
she returns a NULL if no such sequence is found. She obtains (Tˆ , Bˆ) such that Enc(Tˆ , Bˆ) = Wˆ nb1 , and
then finds a unique codeword Vˆ nf ∈ Vnf
Tˆ ,ǫ
that is ǫ-jointly typical to Xnff (w.r.t. PV,Xf ); she returns a
NULL if no such sequence is found.
Key Derivation. Bob computes F = f(V nf ) and S = g(F,B); Alice computes Fˆ = f(Vˆ nf ) and Sˆ =
g(Fˆ , Bˆ).
Fig. 3 shows the connection chain between the random variables/sequences used in the above protocol.
Two variables/sequences are connected by an edge if (1) they belong to input/outputs of the same DMBC,
or (2) one is computed from the other by Alice or Bob using a (possibly randomized) function. The
Markov chain Q1 ↔ Q2 ↔ Q3 holds, if Q3 (resp. Q1) is computed from Q2 by a (possibly randomized)
function φ(R,Q2) where R is independent of Q1 (resp. Q3).
nf
fX
fn
fY
fnV F T
T T
fn
fZ
BobAlice Eve
1 2
bnW1
bn
bX
bn
bY
bn
bZ
B
1B 2B
(a) Encoding and decoding
Eve
BobAlice
fn
fX
fnVˆ Fˆ
bn
bY
SˆBˆ
Tˆ
Alice
Bob
(b) Key derivation by Alice
Eve
BobAlice
f
F
S
SB
B
Alice
Bob
(c) Key derivation by Bob
Fig. 3. The relation between the variables/sequences used in the SKE protocol for (a) encoding/decoding, (b) key derivation by
Alice, and (c) key derivation by Bob
Uniformity Analysis: Proving (18a)
We show that S ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2κ} has a distribution close to uniform. First, we argue about the distributions
of V nf , F , and B.
In the encoding phase, V nf is chosen to be ǫ-jointly typical with Y nff (w.r.t. PV,Yf ). From AEP, for
each vnf ∈ Vnfǫ , there are at most 2nf (H(Yf |V )+ǫ) sequences in Ynff that are ǫ-jointly typical with vnf ;
each appearing with probability at most 2−nf (H(Yf )−ǫ), and so letting
Dvnf = {y
nf
f ∈ Y
nf
f : (y
nf
f , v
nf ) is ǫ-jointly typical w.r.t. PYf ,V },
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we have
∀vnf ∈ Vnfǫ , Pr(V
nf = vnf ) =
∑
D
v
nf
Pr(Y
nf
f = y
nf
f ) Pr(V
nf = vnf |Y
nf
f = y
nf
f )
≤
∑
D
v
nf
Pr(Y
nf
f = y
nf
f )
≤ 2nfH(Yf |V )+nf ǫ × 2−nfH(Yf )+nf ǫ
= 2nf (−I(V ;Yf )+2ǫ) < 2−ηf+5Nǫ. (25)
⇒ ηf − 5Nǫ < nf (I(V ;Yf )− 2ǫ) ≤ H(V
nf ) ≤ ηf = nf (I(V ;Yf ) + α), (26)
where the upper bound on H(V nf ) is due to |Vnfǫ | = 2ηf (see (i)). Since F = f(V nf ) (see the key
derivation phase) and f is a bijective function (see (ii)), we have
∀f ∈ F , Pr(F = f) = Pr(V nf = f−1(f))
⇒ ηf − 5Nǫ < nf (I(V ;Yf )− 2ǫ) ≤ H(F ) ≤ ηf , (27)
Further, B is selected uniformly at random from B of size ηb (see (v) and the encoding phase), and so
∀b ∈ B, Pr(B = b) = 2−ηb ⇒ H(B) = ηb. (28)
From (vi) and the key derivation phase, there are 2κ choices for the key S; hence H(S) ≤ κ = (nf+nb)Rs.
For every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2κ}, the probability that S = i equals to the probability that (F,B) ∈ Gi. More
specifically (see (23) and (24)),
∀i : Pr(S = i) =
∑
f,b∈Gi
Pr(F = f ∧B = b)
≤ 2γ2−ηf+5Nǫ2−ηb = 2γ2−η+5Nǫ
= 2−(κ−5Nǫ)
⇒ (nf + nb)(Rs − δ) ≤ κ− 5Nǫ ≤ H(S) ≤ (nf + nb)Rs, δ ≥ 5ǫ. (29)
Reliability Analysis: Proving (18b)
We shall show that S = Sˆ with high probability. The encoding phase is successful with high probability:
since there are ηf = nf [I(V ;Yf ) + α] sequences in V
nf
ǫ , from joint-AEP, with probability arbitrarily
close to 1, there exists a V nf ∈ Vnfǫ that is ǫ-jointly typical with Y nff (w.r.t. PV,Yf ). The decoding phase
includes two levels of decoding. First, Alice decodes Y nbb to Tˆ and Bˆ. There are 2ηb+ηt codewords W
nb
1
in the codebook C1. From (21) and (22), we have
ηt + ηb = nb,2I(W1;Yb) + nb,1I(W1;Yb)− nbβ < nbI(W1;Yb)− 3Nǫ ≤ nb[I(W1;Yb)− 3ǫ].
Hence, from joint-AEP, with high probability there exists a unique sequence Wˆ nb1 that is ǫ-jointly typical
decoding to Y nbb . In the second level of decoding, Alice focuses on V
nf
Tˆ ,ǫ
as a codebook and looks for a
unique codeword Vˆ nf ∈ Vnf
Tˆ ,ǫ
that is ǫ-jointly typical to Xnff . From (i) and (iii), there are 2ηf−ηt codewords
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in this codebook, and we have
ηf − ηt
(a)
= nf (I(V ;Yf ) + α)− nb,2[I(W1;Yb)− β]
(b)
= nf (I(V ;Xf , Yf ) + α) − nb,2I(W1;Yb) + nb,2β
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nf(I(V ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α) − nb,2I(W1;Yb)− 2nfα+ nb,2β
(c)
< nfI(V ;Xf )− 3Nǫ ≤ nf (I(V ;Xf )− 3ǫ).
Equality (a) follows from (20) and (21), equality (b) is due to the Markov chain V ↔ Yf ↔ Xf , and
inequality (c) follows from (19). Hence, from joint-AEP, the appropriate Vˆ nf ∈ Vnf
Tˆ ,ǫ
is found with high
probability. The rest is key derivation which is deterministic and does not increase the error probability,
i.e., the error probability at the end of the protocol is upper bounded by that of the decoding phase. This
gives Pr(Sˆ 6= S) < δ for arbitrarily small δ.
Secrecy Analysis: Proving (18c)
We shall show that the H(S|Znff , Z
nb
b ) is close to H(S). We first calculate the quantities H(T ), H(T2),
and H(B2), that are used in the sequel. From the encoding phase, T = t(V nf ), and we have (see (i), (iii)
and (21) and (25))
∀t ∈ T , Pr(T = t) =
∑
vnf∈V
nf
t,ǫ
Pr(V nf = vnf )
≤ 2ηf−ηt2−ηf+5Nǫ = 2−ηt+5Nǫ (30)
⇒ ηt − 5Nǫ ≤ H(T ) ≤ ηt, (31)
where the upper bound on H(T ) is due to |T | = 2ηt . From the encoding phase (T2, T1) = tindx(T ), and
we have (see (iv) and (21) and (30))
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2ηt,2}, Pr(T2 = i) = Pr(T ∈ Ti) =
ηt,1∑
j=1
Pr(T = ti,j)
≤ 2ηt,12−ηt+5Nǫ = 2−ηt,2+5Nǫ
⇒ ηt,2 − 5Nǫ ≤ H(T2) ≤ ηt,2, (32)
where the upper bound follows from |T2| = 2ηt,2 . Likewise (B2, B1) = bindx(B) and so, using (V) and
(22), we have
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2ηb,2}, Pr(B2 = i) = Pr(B ∈ Bi) =
ηb,1∑
j=1
Pr(B = bi,j)
= 2ηb,12−ηb = 2−ηb,2
⇒ H(B2) = ηb,2. (33)
In Lemma 1, we give a lower bound for H(S|Znff , Z
nb
b ). Lemma 2 is used to show that this lower
bound is arbitrarily close to H(S). Finally, Corollary 1 uses the results of these two lemmas to prove
(18c).
Lemma 1: Eve’s uncertainty about the secret S, satisfies
H(S|Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ) ≥ H(S)−H(F,B|S, T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )− 19Nǫ.
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Proof:
H(S|Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ) ≥ H(S|T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
= H(S,F,B|T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )−H(F,B|S, T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
= H(F,B|T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )−H(F,B|S, T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
= H(F,B|T2, B2)− I(F,B;Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b |T2, B2)−H(F,B|S, T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ). (34)
In (34), the last term appears in the statement of Lemma 1, so it remains to calculate the first two terms
terms. The first one is written as
H(F,B|T2, B2) = H(F |T2, B2) +H(B|F, T2, B2)
(a)
= H(F |T2) +H(B|B2)
(b)
= H(F ) +H(B)−H(T2)−H(B2) (35)
(c)
≥ ηf − 5Nǫ+ ηb − ηt,2 − ηb,2
(d)
≥ nf (I(V ;Yf )− 2ǫ) + nb,1[I(W1;Yb)− β]− nb,2I(W2;Yb)− nb,1I(W2;Yb)
(e)
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nfI(V ;Yf |Xf)− 2nf ǫ+ nb,1I(W1;Yb)− nbI(W2;Yb)− nb,1β
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nf (I(V ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α) + nb,1I(W1;Yb)− nbI(W2;Yb)− 3nfα− nbβ − 2nfǫ
(f)
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nb,2I(W1;Yb) + nb,1I(W1;Yb)− nbI(W2;Yb)− 3nfα− nbβ − 2nf ǫ
> nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb)− nbI(W2;Yb)− 14Nǫ
(g)
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb|W2)− 14Nǫ (36)
Equality (a) holds since B2 and B are selected independently of T2 and F ; equality (b) holds since
T2 and B2 are deterministic functions of F and B, respectively (see the encoding phase); inequality (c)
follows from (27), (28), (32), and (33); equality (d) follows from (20), (21), and (22); equality (e) is due
to the Markov chain Xf ↔ Yf ↔ V and (viii); equality (f) follows from (19), and equality (g) is due to
the Markov chain W2 ↔W1 ↔ Yb.
The second term in (34) is written as
I(F,B;Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b |T2, B2) = I(F,B;Z
nf
f |T2, B2) + I(F,B;Z
nb
b |Z
nf
f , T2, B2)
(a)
= I(V nf , B;Z
nf
f |T2, B2) + I(V
nf , T, B;Znbb |Z
nf
f , T2, B2)
(b)
= I(V nf , B;Z
nf
f |T2, B2) + I(T,B;Z
nb
b |Z
nf
f , T2, B2)
(c)
≤ I(V nf , B;Z
nf
f |T2, B2) + I(T,B;Z
nb
b |T2, B2)
(d)
≤ I(V nf ;Z
nf
f ) + I(T,B;Z
nb
b |T2, B2)
= I(V nf ;Z
nf
f ) + min{[H(T,B|T2, B2)], [I(T,B;Z
nb
b |T2, B2)]}
(e)
= I(V nf ;Z
nf
f ) + min{[H(T |T2) +H(B|B2)], [H(Z
nb
b |T2, B2)−H(Z
nb
b |T, B, T2, B2)]}
(f)
= I(V nf ;Z
nf
f ) + min{[H(T )−H(T2) +H(B)−H(B2)], [H(Z
nb
b |T2, B2)−H(Z
nb
b |T, B)]}
(g)
≤ nf I(V ;Zf ) +min{nb[I(W1;Yb)− I(W2; Yb)]− 5Nǫ, [H(Z
nb
b |T2, B2)−H(Z
nb
b |T, B)]}
(h)
≤ nf I(V ;Zf ) +min{nb[I(W1;Yb)− I(W2; Yb)]− 5Nǫ, nb[H(Zb|W2)−H(Zb|W1)]}
(i)
≤ nf I(V ;Zf ) +min{nbI(W1;Yb|W2), nbI(W1;Zb|W2)} − 5Nǫ (37)
Inequality (a) holds because V nf = f−1(F ) (the key derivation phase) and T is a deterministic function
of V nf (the encoding phase); equality (b) holds because V nf ↔ (T,B) ↔ Znbb forms a Markov chain;
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inequality (c) is due to the Makov chain Znff ↔ (T,B)↔ Znbb ; inequality (d) is due to the Makov chain
(B,B2, T2) ↔ V
nf ↔ Z
nf
f ; equality (e) holds since T2 and T are obtained independently of B2 and
B; equality (f) holds since T2 and B2 are parts of T and B, respectively; inequality (g) follows from
(28), (31), (32), and (33); inequality (h) follows from AEP, and equality (i) is due to the Markov chain
W2 ↔W1 ↔ Zb. Applying (36) and (37) in (34) gives
H(S|Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ) > nf (I(V ;Xf )− I(V ;Zf )) + nb[I(W1;Yb|W2)− I(W1;Zb|W2)]+
−19Nǫ−H(F,B|S, T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
= (nf + nb)Rs − 19Nǫ−H(F,B|S, T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
≥ H(S)− 19Nǫ−H(F,B|S, T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ),
where the last inequality follows from (29).
Lemma 2: H(F,B|S, T2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ) ≤ h(2ǫ) + 2ǫη.
Proof: We shall show that the knowledge of (S, T2, B2, Znff , Znbb ) gives almost all the information
about F,B. From (xi), knowing S = i gives the partition Gi that F,B belongs to; further, knowing T2 = t2
and B2 = b2 gives the codeword wnb2,t2,b2 ∈ C2 which is used in the encoding phase (see (xii) and (xiii)).
Define the codebook Cei
∆
= {vnf , wnb1 : (f(v
nf ), b) ∈ Gi, w
nb
1 = Enc(t(v
nf ), b), T2 = t2, B2 = b2}.
Given Znff , Z
nb
b , one can search all the codewords in Cei and return a unique
ˆˆ
V nf ,
ˆˆ
W nb1 ∈ C
e
i that is
(ǫ, nf )-bipartite jointly typical to (Znff , Znbb ) w.r.t. (PV,Zf , PW1,Zb); otherwise return a NULL. From (xi),
|Gi| = 2
γ
, and so |Cei | = 2γ−η2 , where η2 = ηt,2+ηb,2. If γ−η2 is sufficiently smaller than nfI(V ;Zf )+
nbI(W1;Zb), from joint-AEP for bipartite sequences (in Theorem 4), the above jointly-typical decoding
will result in arbitrarily small error probability. To prove γ−η2 is smaller than nfI(V ;Zf )+nbI(W1;Zb),
we first calculate the following term.
η = ηf + ηb
= nf (I(V ;Yf ) + α) + nb,1I(W1;Yb)− nbβ
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nf (I(V ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α) + nb,1I(W1;Yb)− 2nfα− nbβ
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb)− 3nfα.
Hence,
γ − η2
(a)
= η − (nf + nb)Rs − ηt,2 − ηb,2
(b)
≤ nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb)− 3nfα+ nf [I(V ;Zf )− I(V ;Xf )]
+nb[I(W1;Zb|W2)− I(W1;Yb|W2)]− nb,2I(W2;Yb)− nb,1I(W2;Yb)
(c)
= nbI(W1;Yb)− 3nfα+ nfI(V ;Zf ) + nb[I(W1;Zb|W2)− I(W1;Yb|W2)]− nbI(W2;Yb)
(d)
= nfI(V ;Zf ) + nbI(W1;Zb|W2)− 3nfα
(e)
< nfI(V ;Zf ) + nbI(W1;Zb)− 9Nǫ.
Equality (a) follows from (x) and (xi), inequality (b) follows from the definition of Rs in (15), equality
(c) follows from (ii), equality (d) is due to the Markov chain W2 ↔ W1 ↔ Yb, and inequality (e)
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is due to the Markov chain W2 ↔ W1 ↔ Zb. From Theorem 4 (joint-AEP for bipartite sequences),
the decoding error probability becomes arbitrarily close to 0, i.e., given (S, T2, B2, Znff , Z
nb
b ), we have
Pr
(
(
ˆˆ
V nf ,
ˆˆ
W nb1 ) 6= (V
nf ,W nb1 )
)
< 2ǫ. Let ˆˆF = f( ˆˆV nf ) and ˆˆB, ˆˆT = Enc( ˆˆW nb1 ), then we have
Pr
(
(
ˆˆ
F,
ˆˆ
B) 6= (F,B)
)
< 2ǫ.
Using Fano’s inequality [9] results in
H(F,B|S, T,B,Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ) ≤ H(F,B|
ˆˆ
F,
ˆˆ
B) ≤ h(2ǫ) + 2ǫη,
where h(ǫ) = −ǫ log(ǫ)− (1− ǫ) log(1− ǫ) is the binary entropy function.
Corollary 1: From Lemmas 1 and 2, for any arbitrarily δ > 0, by choosing appropriately α, β, ǫ > 0,
Eve’s uncertainty rate about S is lower-bounded as
H(S|Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
H(S)
≥ 1− δ.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2, THE UPPER BOUND
There are eight cases for a t-round SKE protocol, depending on the party who initiates the protocol, the
one who calculates S, and whether t is odd or even. We assume t is even, Alice is the initiator, and Bob
calculates S. The other cases can be argued similarly and lead to the same result. Alice sends Xnf,r :rf of
length nf,r in odd rounds r ∈ {1, 3, . . . , t−1}; Bob and Eve receive Y nf,r :rf and Z
nf,r:r
f , respectively. Bob
sends Xnb,r :rb of length nb,r in even rounds r ∈ {2, 4, . . . , t}; Alice and Eve receive Y
nb,r :r
b and Z
nb,r :r
b ,
respectively. Note that the forward and the backward channels are assumed to be used nf and nb times,
respectively, and so
nf =
∑
r∈{1,3,...,t−1}
nf,r, and nb =
∑
r∈{2,4,...,t}
nb,r.
We denote views of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of round r, by V :rA , V :rB , and V :rE , respectively. For
instance V :rA is
V :rA =
(
||(odd)i<r
[
X
nf,i:i
f
])
||
(
||even:i≤r
[
Y
nb,i:i
b
])
.
V :rB and V :rE can be presented similarly. Fig. 4 illustrates the relationships between the sequences of RVs
(and the keys), where two sequences are connected by an edge if (i) they belong to input/outputs of the
same DMBC, or (ii) one is computed from the other by Alice or Bob, using a (possibly randomized)
function.
For an even r, at the end of round r − 1, Bob computes the sequence Xnb,r :rb using his view, V
:r−1
B ,
through a (possibly randomized) function φr(R,V :r−1B ) where the randomness R is independent of other
parties’ views V :r−1A and V
:r−1
E . He sends this sequence in round r, where the received sequences
Y
nb,r :r
f and Z
nb,r:r
f are determined from X
nb,r :r
b through the backward channel transition matrix that
is independently of the the views in round r − 1. Accordingly,
(V :r−1A , V
:r−1
E )↔ V
:r−1
B ↔ X
nb,r :r
b ↔ (Y
nb,r:r
b , Z
nb,r:r
b )
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Fig. 4. The relations between sequences of RVs in a t-round SKE protocol
forms a Markov chain, from which we derive the following four Markov chains, specifically used in the
sequel,
V :r−1B ↔ X
nb,r :r
b ↔ Y
nb,r:r
b , (38a)
V :r−1E ↔ X
nb,r :r
b ↔ Y
nb,r:r
b , (38b)
(Y
nb,r:r
b , Z
nb,r :r
b )↔ V
:r−1
B ↔ V
:r−1
A , (38c)
X
nb,r :r
b ↔ V
:r−1
B ↔ V
:r−1
A . (38d)
By symmetry, one can show Markov chains between variables when r is odd. The views of the parties
at the end of the protocol are then V iewA = V :tA , V iewB = V :tB , and V iewE = V :tE . Bob computes the
key S ∈ S as a function of V :tB and Alice computes Sˆ ∈ S as a function of V :tA . Note that the rate Rsk
for an arbitrarily small δ > 0 is achievable if (2) is satisfied. Using Fano’s inequality for (2b), we have
H(S|V iewA) ≤ H(S|Sˆ) < h(δ) + δH(S), (39)
Furthermore, (2c) gives
I(S;V iewE) = H(S)−H(S|V iewE) ≤ δH(S). (40)
For given nf and nb, H(S) is upper bounded as
H(S)= I(S;V :tA ) +H(S|V
:t
A )
(a)
≤I(S;V :tA ) + h(δ) + δH(S) − I(S;V
:t
E ) + I(S;V
:t
E )
(b)
≤ I(S;V :tA )− I(S;V
:t
E ) + h(δ) + 2δH(S)
≤ I(S;V :tA |V
:t
E ) + h(δ) + 2δH(S) (41)
(c)
≤ I(V :tB ;V
:t
A |V
:t
E ) + h(δ) + 2δH(S)
⇒ H(S) ≤
1
1− 2δ
[I(V :tB ;V
:t
A |V
:t
E ) + h(δ)]. (42)
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Inequalities (a) and (b) follow from (39) and (40), respectively, and inequality (c) follows from the Markov
chain S ↔ V :tB ↔ V :tA . The first term in (41) is written as follows
I(V :tB ;V
:t
A |V
:t
E )
= I(V :tB ;Y
nb,t:t
b |V
:t
E ) + I(V
:t
B ;V
:t−1
A |V
:t
E , Y
nb,t:t
b )
(a)
= I(X
nb,t:t
b ;Y
nb,t:t
b |V
:t
E ) + I(V
:t
B ;V
:t−1
A |V
:t
E , Y
nb,t:t
b )
(b)
≤ I(X
nb,t:t
b ;Y
nb,t:t
b |Z
nb,t:t
b ) + I(V
:t
B ;V
:t−1
A |V
:t
E , Y
nb,t:t
b )
(c)
≤ I(X
nb,t:t
b ;Y
nb,t:t
b |Z
nb,t:t
b ) + I(V
:t
B ;V
:t−1
A |V
:t−1
E )
(d)
= I(X
nb,t:t
b ;Y
nb,t:t
b |Z
nb,t:t
b ) + I(V
:t−1
B ;V
:t−1
A |V
:t−1
E ). (43)
(In)equalities (a)-(d) follow from the Markov chains (38a)-(38d), respectively, when r = t. By symmetry,
one can write the second term in (43) as
I(V :t−1B ;V
:t−1
A |V
:t−1
E ) ≤ I(Y
nf,t−1:t−1
f ;X
nf,t−1:t−1
f |Z
nf,t−1:t−1
f ) + I(V
:t−2
B ;V
:t−2
A |V
:t−2
E ). (44)
Repeating the steps in (43) and (44) t/2 times, we arrive at
I(V :tB ;V
:t
A |V
:t
E ) ≤
∑
(odd)r<t
I(Y
nf,t:r
f ;X
nf,t:r
f |Z
nf,t:r
f ) +
∑
(even)r≤t
I(X
nb,t:r
b ;Y
nb,t:r
b |Z
nb,t:r
b ). (45)
For an odd (resp. even) r, define X :rf (resp. X :rb ) such that
PX :rf =
1
nf,r
nf,r∑
i=1
PX :rf,i , (resp. PX :rb =
1
nb,r
nb,r∑
i=1
PX :rb,i ).
Obtain Y :rf , Z :rf (resp. Y :rb , Z :rb ) from the 2DMBC conditional distributions. We choose the RVs Xf , Yf , Zf
and Xb, Yb, Zb that correspond to the 2DMBC distributions (PYf ,Zf |Xf and PYb,Zb|Xb), and Xf and Xb
are selected to satisfy
I(Xf ;Yf |Zf ) = max
(odd)r<t
[I(X :rf ;Y
:r
f |Z
:r
f )], I(Xb;Yb|Zb) = max
(even)r<t
[I(X :rb ;Y
:r
b |Z
:r
b )],
respectively. We continue (45) as
I(V :tB ;V
:t
A |V
:t
E )
(a)
≤
∑
(odd)r<t
nf,rI(Yf ;Xf |Zf ) +
∑
even:r≤t
nb,rI(Xb;Yb|Zb)
= nfI(Xf ;Yf |Zf ) + nbI(Xb;Yb|Zb). (46)
Inequality (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality since I(Xf ;Yf |Zf ) and I(Xb;Yb|Zb) are concave
functions of PXf and PXb , respectively (see e.g., [11, Appendix-I]). We have shown that for any SKE
protocol, there exist RVs for which (46) holds.
Using (2a), (41) and (46), we have the following upper bound on Rsk
Rsk<
1
nf + nb
H(S) + δ
<
nfI(Xf ;Yf |Zf ) + nbI(Xb;Yb|Zb) + h(δ)
(1− 2δ)(nf + nb)
+ δ
≤max{I(Xf ;Yf |Zf ), I(Xb;Yb|Zb)},
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where the last inequality follows from the fact that δ is arbitrarily small. This proves the upper bound in
(8).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3, DEGRADED 2DMBCS
Lemma 3: For the degraded DMBC as defined in Definition 5, we have I(X;Y |Z) ≤ I(XO;YO|ZO).
Proof:
I(X;Y |Z) = I(XO,XR;YO, YR|ZO, ZR)
= I(XO;YO, YR|ZO, ZR) + I(XR;YO, YR|ZO, ZR,XO)
(a)
= I(XO;YO|ZO, ZR) + I(XR;YR|ZO, ZR,XO)
(b)
= I(XO;YO|ZO, ZR)
(c)
≤ I(XO;YO|ZO).
Equalities (a) is due to the Markov chains XO ↔ ZR ↔ YR and XR ↔ XO ↔ YO, equality (b) is due
to XR ↔ ZR ↔ YR, and equality (c) is due to ZR ↔ XO ↔ YO.
Cd−2DMBCsk is upper bounded as (see Theorem 2)
Cd−2DMBCsk ≤ max
PXf ,PXb
{I(Xf ;Yf |Zf ), I(Xb;Yb|Zb)}
≤ max
PXf ,PXb
{I(Xf,O;Yf,O|Zf,O), I(Xb,O;Yb,O|Zb,O)}, (47)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3. On the other hand, the lower bounded in (5) holds for
Cd−2DMBCsk . Starting from (6), we write LA as
LA
(a)
≥ max
nf ,nb,PXf ,PXb
[
nb[I(Xb,O;Yb)− I(Xb,O;Zb)]+
nf + nb
]
(b)
≥ max
PXb,O
[I(Xb,O;Yb)− I(Xb,O;Zb)]+
(c)
= max
PXb,O
[I(Xb,O;Yb,O)− I(Xb,O;Zb,O)]+
= max
PXb,O
[I(Xb,O;Yb,O|Zb,O)]. (48)
Inequality (a) follows from choosing Vf = 0, W2,b = 0, and W1,b = Xb,O. Since the argument to be
maximized in the right hand of inequality (a) is independent of PXf , we remove PXf from the expression.
Inequality (b) is obtained by choosing nb sufficiently larger than nf and letting Xb,R have a constant value.
Equality (c) holds since Xb,R, and hence Yb,R and Zb,R, are independent of Xb,O. By symmetry, one can
show that
LB ≥ max
PXf,O
[I(Xf,O;Yf,O|Zf,O)]. (49)
Combining (47)-(49) proves the theorem.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4, JOINT-AEP FOR BIPARTITE SEQUENCES (IN APPENDIX A)
Part 1) To prove Pr((XN , Y N ) ∈ A(N,n)ǫ )→ 1
We shall show that with high probability XN and Y N are (ǫ, n)-bipartite typical sequences as in (9) and
(XN , Y N ) satisfy (11) in Definition 8. For large enough n and d, by the weak law of large numbers, we
have
− 1
n
log PU (U
n)→ −E[log PU (U)] = H(U) in probability
⇒ ∃n1 : ∀n > n1,Pr(| −
1
n
logPU (U
n)−H(U)| > ǫ) < ǫ6 ,
Similarly, we can conclude the following for the other parts of the sequences.
∃d1 : ∀d > d1,Pr(| −
1
d
log PT (T
d)−H(T )| > ǫ) < ǫ6 ,
∃n2 : ∀n > n2,Pr(| −
1
n
logPU ′(U
′n)−H(U ′)| > ǫ) < ǫ6 ,
∃d2 : ∀d > d2,Pr(| −
1
d
logPT ′(T
′d)−H(T ′)| > ǫ) < ǫ6 .
Since these sequences are i.i.d., we have
log P (XN ) = logPU (U
n) + log PT (T
d),
log P (Y N ) = logPU ′(U
′n) + log PT ′(T
′d),
which finally results in
∀n > n1,∀d > d1,Pr(| −
1
N
log P (XN )− nH(U)+dH(T )
N
| > ǫ) < ǫ3 , (50)
∀n > n2,∀d > d2,Pr(| −
1
N
logP (Y N )− nH(U
′)+dH(T ′)
N
| > ǫ) < ǫ3 . (51)
The same approach results in the following relations for the joint distribution,
∃n3 : ∀n > n3,Pr(| −
1
d
logPT,T ′(T
d, T ′d)−H(T, T ′)| > ǫ) < ǫ6 ,
∃d3 : ∀d > d3,Pr(| −
1
n
logPU,U ′(U
n, U ′n)−H(U,U ′)| > ǫ) < ǫ6 ,
⇒ ∀n > n3,∀d > d3,Pr(| −
1
N
log P (XN , Y N )− nH(U,U
′)+dH(T,T ′)
N
| > ǫ) < ǫ3 . (52)
By choosing n > max{n1, n2, n3} and d > max{d1, d2, d3}, (50), (51), and (52) are satisfied. The
probability union bound (over these three equations) states that (XN , Y N ) /∈ A(N,n)ǫ holds with probability
less than ǫ, i.e., Pr((XN , Y N ) ∈ A(N,n)ǫ ) ≥ 1− ǫ. This proves the first part of the theorem.
Part 2) To prove (1− ǫ)2nH(U,U ′)+dH(T,T ′)−Nǫ ≤ |A(N,n)ǫ | ≤ 2nH(U,U ′)+dH(T,T ′)+Nǫ
1 =
∑
P (xN , yN ) ≥
∑
A
(N,n)
ǫ
P (xN , yN )
(a)
≥ |A(N,n)ǫ |2
−(nH(U,U ′)+dH(T,T ′)+Nǫ)
⇒ |A(N,n)ǫ | ≤ 2
nH(U,U ′)+dH(T,T ′)+Nǫ
,
and
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1− ǫ ≤
∑
A
(N,n)
ǫ
P (xN , yN )
(b)
≤ |A(N,n)ǫ |2
−nH(U,U ′)−dH(T,T ′)+Nǫ
⇒ |A(N,n)ǫ | ≥ (1− ǫ)2
nH(U,U ′)+dH(T,T ′)−Nǫ
.
Both inequalities (a) and (b) follow (52).
Part 3) To prove (1− ǫ)2−nI(U ;U ′)−dI(T ;T ′)−3Nǫ ≤ Pr((X˜N , Y˜ N ) ∈ A(N,n)ǫ ) ≤ 2−nI(U ;U ′)−dI(T ;T ′)+3Nǫ
Note that X˜N and Y˜ N are independent and Pr(X˜N = xN , Y˜ N = yN ) = P (xN )P (yN ). Using (50),
(51), and (52), we have
Pr((X˜N , Y˜ N ) ∈ A(N,n)ǫ ) =
∑
A
(N,n)
ǫ
P (xN )P (yN )
≤
(
2nH(U,U
′)+dH(T,T ′)+Nǫ
)(
2−nH(U)−dH(T )+Nǫ
)(
2−nH(U
′)−dH(T ′)+Nǫ
)
= 2−nI(U ;U
′)−dI(T ;T ′)+3Nǫ
,
and
Pr((X˜N , Y˜ N ) ∈ A(N,n)ǫ ) =
∑
A
(N,n)
ǫ
P (xN )P (yN )
≥ (1− ǫ)
(
2nH(U,U
′)+dH(T,T ′)−Nǫ
)(
2−nH(U)−dH(T )−Nǫ
)(
2−nH(U
′)−dH(T ′)−Nǫ
)
= (1− ǫ)2−nI(U ;U
′)−dI(T ;T ′)−3Nǫ
.
